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Network Equilibrium and the Spread of Innovation in Technologically Cooperating 
European SMEs  
 
Abstract 
European technical cooperation data from a recent large survey on small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) is used to formulate a proxy network of country typical SMEs (CTSMEs) 
and reveal measures of centrality, bridging, density and structural equivalence. The longer 
established European member CTSMEs show similar structural equivalence, while the same 
is true for the new member states. We found that the innovativeness of a body of structurally 
equivalent CTSMEs is positively related to their gatekeeper role and ability to occupy 
balanced Simmelian as opposed to balanced ordinary bridging positions, highlighting the 
value of cooperation as opposed to competition in the growth of innovation. This brings 
enhanced understanding to organisations about areas for long term trans-regional business 
improvement.  
Keywords: Innovation; Small and Medium Enterprises; Technical Cooperation;  
                   Brokerage; Social networks; Structure 
 
1. Introduction 
      A firm’s ability to recognize, absorb and apply new ideas, referred to by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) as its absorptive capacity, is enhanced by the way in which it spans 
organizational boundaries (Bellamy et al., 2014). If these boundaries are porous this allows 
scope for interaction with the environment and “open innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003) 
leading to the enhancement of value creation (Enkel, 2010; Lee et al., 2010). Laursen and 
Salter (2006) investigate the influence of search strategies for external knowledge and 
develop the concepts of breadth and depth as two components of the openness of individual 
firms’ external search strategies. There is evidence within Europe that being open for 
innovation generally pays off provided that a suitable marketing strategy is adopted (Teichert 
& Bounchen, 2011; Grimpe & Sofka, 2009) together with an outgoing approach to 
technological cooperation in a technologically advanced environment (Sofka & Grimpe, 
2010). This supports an SME’s motivation for cooperation by having better access to larger 
markets, a cheaper supply of materials and components, but also a reduction of costs for 
various services and a smooth and assured meeting of client demands manifesting a 
network of direct and indirect ties which can enhance potential for increased prosperity (Villa, 
2009).   
 The use of social network analysis has been applied to significant effect, from the 
examination of micro processes in social networks of those involved in organizational 
innovation in the automotive business (Obstfeld, 2005), to the way in which knowledge-
sharing ties span internal boundaries in the R&D division of a global high-tech company 
(Tortoriello et al., 2010), to the examination of structural holes in Canadian mutual fund 
companies (Zaheer et al., 2005). Studies of firms’ innovation output have also focussed on 
the structure of their supply, as opposed to their technical cooperation, networks. Bellamy et 
al. (2014) use social network analysis to demonstrate that supply network accessibility as 
well as absorptive capacity have a significant association with a firm’s innovation output. 
Other studies include Havnes and Hauge (2004) who adopt an ‘enterprise perspective’ 
focussing on each SME’s ego network as well as adopting a case study approach 
highlighting the cooperation development trend as steadily shifting towards more stable, long 
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lasting, strategic and committed partnerships not withstanding a built in desire of SMEs to 
maintain independence and avoid the risk of disclosing sensitive information. Another study 
is the EIM Report (2010) summarising the internationalisation of European SMEs with details 
of the levels of technical cooperation and innovation with the positive contribution made to 
exports. Pearson and Cabras (2014) concentrate on northern European technical 
cooperation networks and carry out probit analysis to identify a strong link between 
connectivity factors and increased innovation.  
Research has also been carried out showing that a country’s economic structure, as 
well as its evolution, is influenced by the tacit knowledge available in neighbouring countries 
(Bahar et al., 2012). It is argued, on the one hand, that the exploitation of gaps in a network 
called “structural holes” (Burt, 1992) enables competitive advantage while on the other that 
embeddedness in a highly integrated network of equity-based collaborating partnerships 
enables companies to respond effectively to radical changes in their technological 
environment and promotes innovation through inter-firm trust (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 
2007). Previous studies include that carried out by Amighini and Gorgoni (2013) who use 
social network analysis concepts of centrality, brokerage and structure to explore how the 
structure of the world trade (export and import) network in automotive components changed 
over the last decade. They also explore the roles played by each country in linking various 
geographical regional groupings. 
One of the common tie structures associated with business activity is bridging ties. 
There are various types of such ties. One type has individual firms acting as bridges 
between other individual firms (Burt, 1992). Another has individual firms acting as bridges 
between groups of other firms, where the groups are defined according to geographical 
proximity (Amighini and Gorgoni, 2013). Some researchers have focussed on the finding that 
innovative and technological patent diversity of firms peaks when there is a balance between 
the location of newly formed ties within and outside of the main network component (Gulati 
et al., 2012), where the components are identified by clustering methods. They thereby 
demonstrate a dynamic equilibrium which evolves over time as well as uncovering an 
inverted U-shaped evolutionary pattern to a small world structure, whereby an increase in 
the smallworldliness of the system is followed by a later decline. Another type of bridging tie, 
known as a Simmelian tie (Simmel, 1950), with another party requires the presence of 
common third-party ties which enhance the collaborative aspect of cooperation. It is the sort 
of tie that spans organizational boundaries and is conducive to the generation of innovations 
(Krackhardt and Kilduff, (2002); Obsfeldt, (2005); Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010).  
 Studying the structure of technical cooperation networks leads to the concept of 
structural equivalence rather than geographical proximity or clustering as a determinant of 
group membership. Structurally equivalent actors tend to mimic each other which, for firms, 
means that they tend to form similar tie structures when they engage in competitive and 
cooperative behaviour (Friedkin, N. 1998; Mizruchi, 1990). This provides a different view of 
the way in which groups or ‘blocks’ of actors engage with each other by studying the way in 
which individuals act as bridges (non-Simmelian and Simmelian) between blocks of other 
actors. It enables the study of within and outside of block ties and enables the formulation of 
a hypothesis on the association between the balance between such ties and innovativeness. 
Another feature of this approach is the light it shines on each actor’s capacity to play a 
brokerage role (Gould and Fernandez, 1989) within its own block and the overall block 
structure. Of typical importance in this view is the role played by a gatekeeper who acts as 
both a monitor of the environment and translator of the technical information into a form 
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understandable to the members of its group (Tushman, 1977) and so improves the 
absorptive capacity of each group member for innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Marshall (1920) introduced the concept of a representative producer to resolve issues 
around market equilibrium and the governance of the supply price of a commodity. Recent 
developments in social capital and network theory lead us to the formulation of a related 
network concept, which is used for investigating issues around the balance (or equilibrium) 
of network structures and the spread of innovation.The actors in our study are therefore 
formed by averaging the economic and network characteristics of each country’s SMEs in 
order to apply social network methodology to uncover the network structure and economic 
and innovation activity of typical firms whose membership ranges across all European 
countries. We introduce the term ‘country typical SME’ (CTSME) representing the typical or 
representative SME in a certain country who’s characteristics are derived from the 
networking and economic details of the SMEs interviewed in each of 33 European countries 
in a large survey of over 9480 SMEs. We thereby construct a proxy network of 33 country 
typical SMEs who’s economic and network behaviour are extracted from the SMEs surveyed 
in each country and whose characteristics build a picture of how a typical SME behaves in a 
particular country with regard to its innovation activity and technical cooperation links with 
typical SMEs in other countries. We then employ structurally equivalent blocks of CTSMEs, 
rather than geographically or economically defined clusters (Villa, 2009), in order to explore 
fundamental similarities in the way in which blocks of actors emulate each other’s network 
behaviour as well as the balance which occurs within and outside of these blocks. Our study 
helps address questions about the way in which typical firms choose to cooperate with 
bodies in other countries as well as which countries are close with regard to technical 
cooperation.  
Economic or knowledge-based factors also influence innovation and so are included as 
control variables. We might, for instance, expect growth in the workforce and turnover, as 
signs of healthy economic progress, to be associated with a firm’s innovative activity (Freel & 
Robson, 2004). The age of an SME could also count since SMEs take time to absorb and 
accumulate the knowledge required for innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zaheer et. al., 
2005; Obstfeld, 2005). An SME might also increase opportunities for innovation by 
investment abroad (EIM Report, 2010) or by the receipt of government financial or logistic 
support (Garcia & Mohnen, 2010; Lin & Ho, 2008). These and the above social network 
issues are addressed by developing a technical cooperation network using data from a 
survey on the internationalisation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) carried out in 33 
European countries (EIM Report, 2010).  
In the following sections we describe our methods, establish our hypotheses and outline 
our results. We both summarise and discuss our findings and close with implications for 
practice. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
We formulate the technical cooperation links between the CTSMEs in different European 
countries into a matrix which can be viewed as a valued sociogram for analysis using 
sociometric methods displaying features which are characteristic of network data. One such 
feature is the asymmetric nature of the technical cooperation matrix. For instance, the 
Danish CTSME’s preferences for technical cooperation with the Swedish CTSME are not the 
same as Sweden’s for the Danish CTSME. We can therefore identify ways in which power is 
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structured in the network. We can also uncover evidence of structural holes and other 
network features. The scores in this matrix do not, however, refer to ties between SMEs but 
between CTSMEs and measure the likelihood that technical cooperation relationships such 
as bridges between firms in respective countries exist. The CTSME network therefore acts 
as an indicator or proxy for the overall technical cooperation network between SMEs in 
Europe. The more preferences that are expressed for cooperation with SMEs in a particular 
country, given that at least one tie exists for each SME expressing named preferences due 
to the structure of the survey, then the more likely it is that ties exist between the countries’ 
firms1.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
We noted above that there is evidence within Europe that being open for innovation 
generally pays off provided that a suitable marketing strategy is adopted (Teichert & 
Bounchen, 2011; Grimpe & Sofka, 2009) together with an outgoing approach to 
technological cooperation (Sofka & Grimpe, 2010). Formulating a preference for cooperation 
is, according to this view, the first step in achieving improved innovation. We therefore state 
our first hypothesis as:  
 
Hypothesis 1: CTSMEs enhance their innovativeness by having a strong preference for 
technical cooperation measured by high network outdegree 
The term ‘structural hole’ was introduced by Burt (1992; 2005) to describe aspects of 
positional advantage or disadvantage determined by the way firms are embedded in 
neighbourhoods. A structural hole is an absent tie or relationship between partners (nodes) 
in a firm’s network such that firms which occupy a position which bridges structural holes are 
better positioned to outperform other firms which do not occupy such positions. A key part is 
played by ‘bridges’ who act as links between clusters of firms as information benefits are 
expected to travel over bridges. One of the tasks for a strategic firm in building an efficient 
technological innovation network is to focus on the maintenance of bridge ties between 
groups of firms in the neighbourhood (Zaheer & Bell, 2005; Soda, 2011). Bridge ties are 
valuable in separating non-redundant information sources so that non-overlapping innovative 
ideas are brought together (Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Feng et al., 2011). The structure of 
alliance networks, then, strongly influences their potential for knowledge creation (Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007) with non-redundant connections contracting the distance between firms. This 
leads to the formulation of our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: CTSMEs enhance their innovativeness by bridging structural holes in their 
technical cooperation network 
 As a corollary it has been argued that network closure, characteristic of dense networks, 
does not enhance firm performance since fewer structural holes appear in such networks 
(Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Soda, 2011). We therefore also test the network hypothesis for 
density: 
 
                                                          
1 We occasionally refer to a country typical SME by the name of the country (e.g. “Austria” instead of “Austria’s 
CTSME”). 
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Hypothesis 3: CTSMEs reduce their innovativeness by occupying dense technical 
cooperation networks 
The concept of structural equivalence describes the way in which firms behave similarly with 
regard to their pattern of network bonds, such as symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity, even if 
they do not actually have ties with each other (Friedkin, N. 1998; Mizruchi, 1990). The theory 
of structural equivalence has developed through the use of block models (White et al., 1976) 
and has subsequently been used in the analysis of business networks (Burt, 1987; Todeva, 
2006; Pallotti et al., 2011), where the leading assumption is that structurally equivalent 
actors tend to mimic each other which, for firms, means that they tend to form similar tie 
structures when they engage in competitive and cooperative behaviour. The structurally 
equivalent blocks can also be incorporated into the methods of Gould and Fernandez (1989) 
to categorise brokerage roles, such as gatekeeper and liaison by group membership. Of 
particular interest is a gatekeeper who both monitors the environment and translates the 
technical information into a form understandable to the members of its group (Tushman, 
1977) and so improves the absorptive capacity of each group member for innovation (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). In our context the ‘group’ is the structurally equivalent block in the 
technical cooperation network of CTSMEs. In this way the member CTSMEs benefit from the 
overall gatekeeping capacity of their block. On the other hand a liaison CTSME passes 
technical information between members of other blocks and so limits its own absorptive 
capacity (through limited engagement), but not necessarily the absorptive capacity of the 
members of its block, for the development of innovation. This leads to the formulation of the 
next two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4: A CTSME reduces its innovativeness by occupying a liaison role within its 
structurally equivalent block  
Hypothesis 5: A CTSME’s innovativeness is enhanced by its block’s gatekeeping capacity 
Central to Cohen and Levinthals’ (1990) absorptive capacity is whether a firm stands at the 
interface between internal subunits within the firm and the external environment. The 
interface function can be diffused across individuals or organizations so that, when the 
expertise of most individuals within the organization differs considerably from those outside 
of it, some group members may profitably act as gatekeepers or boundary spanners. The 
gatekeeper therefore monitors the environment and translates it into a form understandable 
to the research group. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) highlight the need for a trade-off or 
equilibrium between inward-looking versus outward-looking absorptive capacities. Laursen 
and Salter (2006) argue that poor allocation of managerial attention can lead to firms 
engaging in too many (or too few) external and internal communication channels and 
propose equilibrium between the two types of engagement. Gulati et al. (2012) argue that 
technological patent diversity of firms peaks when there is a balance between the location of 
newly formed ties within and outside of the main network component. We therefore 
formulate our next hypothesis as: 
 
Hypothesis 6: A CTSME enhances its innovativeness through balanced bridging ties within 
and outside of its structurally equivalent block of CTSMEs in the technical cooperation 
network  
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The structural hole concept has been challenged and refined during the debate 
between competitiveness and collaboration as the main drivers of innovative productivity. 
Obstfeld (2005) introduces a 7-point tertius iungens (or “third who joins”) orientation scale to 
capture a predisposition to bring people together in collaboration and contrasts it with the 
tertius gaudens orientation emphasized in structural holes theory. He then positively relates 
the level of innovation to the tertius iungens scale as well as diverse social knowledge and 
dense social networks in automotive manufacture. Tortoriello and Krackhardt (2010) study 
the conditions under which having bridging ties that span organizational boundaries are 
conducive to the generation of innovations and conclude that a particular type of bridging tie 
known as a Simmelian tie is associated with the generation of innovations. The work relates 
to that of Obsfeldt (2005) and Krackhardt and Kilduff (2002) because a Simmelian tie 
(Simmel, 1950) with another party requires the presence of common third-party ties which 
enhance the collaborative aspect of cooperation together with the acquisition of innovative 
information. The seventh hypothesis is therefore formulated from the brokerage refinement 
between competitiveness and collaboration and the value of Simmelian ties in promoting 
innovation using the equilibrium measure formulated in Section 3.2 (Obstfeld, 2005; 
Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Laursen and Salter, 2006): 
 
Hypothesis 7: A CTSME enhances its innovativeness through balanced Simmelian bridging 
ties within and outside of its structurally equivalent block of CTSMEs in the technical 
cooperation network    
Economic factors include: growth in the workforce and turnover, as signs of healthy 
economic progress, (Freel & Robson, 2004); the age of an SME, since SMEs take time to 
absorb and accumulate the knowledge required for innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Zaheer et. al., 2005; Obstfeld, 2005); increased opportunities for SME innovation by 
investment abroad (EIM Report, 2010); the receipt of government financial or logistic support 
(Garcia & Mohnen, 2010; Lin & Ho, 2008; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). All of these factors 
could be associated with a firm’s innovative activity and so we treat them as control variables 
and apply least squares regression analysis to identify a relationship between the network 
and economic variables and innovativeness as dependent variable.  
 
3. Methods  
3.1 The Data 
The data were extracted from a survey carried out by EIM (Business and Policy 
Research) of 9,480 SMEs in 33 European countries (including some countries such as 
Turkey which is currently outside the EU) during spring 2009. The number of SMEs 
interviewed in each country was in proportion to the population size of the country. 7% of the 
SMEs in the 33 countries surveyed had technological cooperation with enterprises abroad: 
the larger the company the more likely is the occurrence of technical cooperation. Initial 
findings were published in a report (EIM, 2010). Regarding innovativeness the respondents 
to the questionnaire were asked the following question: 
Did your enterprise introduce any new product or service on the market in the last 3 years which is new for our 
sector in this country?    
If the respondent answered ‘yes’ then a dichotomous variable with value 0 (no) or 1 (yes) 
was formulated for that SME. These scores were averaged across all SMEs in each 
European country, which produced a scalar variable suitable as a dependent variable for 
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least squares regression analysis. It was not possible to determine if the companies had 
actually introduced any new product or service as this was self-reported innovative activity. 
However, we checked the figures against those published by the European Union for 2006 
(Eurostat Yearbook, 2010) and found a weakly positive correlation for all countries surveyed 
(Spearman’s rho = 0.304, p=0.109) while there was a strong positive correlation for countries 
with Simmelian ties (Spearman’s rho = 0.431, p=0.025). 
3.2 Technical Cooperation Matrix  
One of the questions in the survey asks the respondent who represents the SME: 
Did your enterprise in 2006 -2008 have any technological co-operation (e.g. technology transfer) with 
enterprises abroad? 
If the answer to this question is ‘yes’ the survey then asks: 
What are the top three countries for Technology co-operation / Technology transfer with enterprise abroad? 
LIST ONLY ONE COUNTRY PER LINE 
 1.  ……………………………  
 2.  …………………………… 
 3.  …………………………… 
 
Even though the respondent in the latter question already engages in technical 
cooperation with at least one country the question may indicate a preference rather than 
actual cooperation for some of the named countries. We use this data to construct a proxy 
technical cooperation matrix consisting of the country typical SMEs (CTSMEs) in Europe. 
The matrix entries are weighted averages of the scores given by SMEs in a particular 
country to their preference for technical cooperation with firms or organisations in other 
countries2. The first named country is given the highest weight (0.5) since it is the most likely 
country where actual technical cooperation is taking place, as we know that the SME is 
already engaged in some cooperation. The other named countries are given weights of 0.3 
and 0.2, respectively, reflecting preferences and the lower probability that actual cooperation 
is happening with these countries. So, for instance, 6 Danish companies named Sweden as 
first choice for technical cooperation, 4 as second choice and none as third choice, giving an 
overall preference of Danish firms for technical cooperation with Swedish firms of 100x(0.5 x 
6 + 0.3 x 4 + 0.2 x 0)/197 = 2.13, where there are 197 Danish SMEs in the survey and the 
score is expressed as a percentage. In this way we develop a 33x33 matrix with elements 
containing the weighted average of scores for SMEs in all 33 European countries. These 
weighted averages measure the representative score for SMEs in a particular country.  
 
3.3. Balanced Ties  
The concept of structurally equivalent block applies to a group of countries that have 
similar relationships with the same other countries in the technical cooperation network. We 
use two types of ties, ordinary and Simmelian bridging (Section 4.6 and Figures 3a and 3b) 
ties within and outside of structurally equivalent blocks to investigate any relationship with 
CTSME innovativeness. Krackhardt & Stern (1988) proposed the E-I index as a measure of 
homophily/heterophily relating to internal and external relationships. It is defined as: 
E-I Index = (E-I)/(E+I) 
where E is the number of external (between-group) relationship edges and I is the number of 
internal (within-group) relationship edges. Smaller values indicate homophily while larger 
                                                          
2 The survey does not incorporate information on ties linking SMEs to other SMEs in the same country 
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values indicate heterophily. The index can be applied to the block structures containing 
CTSMEs so that, for instance, Sweden can be given an index value between -1 and +1 
indicating the proportion of ties that lie within the Baltic Sea block of countries compared to 
those lying outside of this block. A score of -1 indicates that all ties are internal while a score 
of +1 indicates that all are external. We formulate the balanced E-I Index from our discussion 
of Hypothesis 6 (above) in order to reflect a balance between internal and external ties:  
 Balanced E-I Index for CTSME as a function of its E-I index =  
1 −  abs(median(E − I Index)  −  (E − I Index)) + median(E − I Index)
1 + median (E − I Index)
                            (1) 
where the median of the E-I index is calculated across all CTSMEs with bridging ties. The 
balanced E-I Index has been standardised so that it has values between 0 and 1. This index 
reflects the equilibrium recommended by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) by reaching a 
maximum when the number of inward-looking ties for a CTSME within the block structure is 
balanced against the number of outward-looking ties according to the characteristics of the 
block to which the CTSME belongs. 
Work by Obstfeld (2005) and Tortoriello & Krackhardt (2010) highlighted the value of 
Simmelian as opposed to just bridging ties. Simmelian ties are associated with greater 
technical cooperation in the presence of a third collaborator and are thought to provide a 
more stable and trusting environment for effective innovation. We therefore also formulate in 
a similar way the balanced Simmelian E-I Index in Hypothesis 7 (above) using the formula 
(1) where the median of the E-I index is calculated across all CTSMEs with Simmelian ties.  
If there are no Simmelian ties for a country (vacuous case) then it is excluded from the 
analysis. The index is also standardised so that its values range from 0 to 1. The maximum 
value of both balanced E-I indices occurs when the E-I index of a CTSME equals the median 
E-I index of all CTSMEs. If this median is greater than zero then the CTSMEs of all blocks 
are generally more outward-looking and vice-versa if the median is less than zero. For this 
case the median E-I index of all CTSMEs with bridging ties is 0.72 while for the 26 countries 
with Simmelian ties it is 0.28, indicating in both cases a generally positive outward-looking 
approach.  
 
3.4. Economic Variables  
We incorporate a number of economic variables as controls on innovativeness. One such 
factor is whether or not the CTSME is expanding which relates to economic growth (Freel & 
Robson, 2004). Another is whether or not a CTSME receives government support (Garcia & 
Mohnen, 2010; Lin & Ho, 2008; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991), which may occur either through 
financial or by logistical assistance. The effects of other economic variables, such as 
increase in turnover, age of SME (as a sign of maturity and absorptive capacity) and 
investment abroad (Pearson and Cabras, 2014), were tested but found not to have any 
significant effect on innovation levels for our model. 
 
4. Results 
We categorise countries on the strategic and structural characteristics of the technical 
cooperation networks formed by their firms. We make use of the social network software 
UCINET (Borgatti and Everett, 2002) to calculate the measures of centrality and brokerage. 
We then perform regression analysis with innovativeness as dependent with explanatory 
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network and economic variables. Country population is used as a control variable as a 
precaution lest the sample sizes for each country were chosen disproportionately. 
4.1 Innovative Firms  
Innovative activity is measured dichotomously and indicates whether the SME 
introduced any new product on the market in the period 2006-2008. Table 1 shows the 
proportion of firms in each country who have introduced such a new product. Some 
information was not forthcoming from the data set (or was limited in its scope). We were not, 
for example, able to extract precise details on the type of innovation in which the firms were 
engaged. Nor were we able to discover the amount of R&D carried out by the firms. Iceland, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Lithuania and Norway all have high proportions (>30%) 
while France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and Portugal have low proportions (<15%) with 
the other countries falling between the two extremes. It is noted that the survey was carried 
out among SMEs and not larger firms with more than 250 employees. According to the 
Eurostat Yearbook (2013) large enterprises tend to innovate more than SMEs so that 
countries with a high proportion of large enterprises such as Germany, which had the 
highest propensity in Europe in 2008 to innovate measured across all enterprises, do not 
show such high SME innovation figures. 
 
4.2 Egonet Density 
A country’s ego-network includes the specific country and all the countries that are 
connected to it through technical cooperation (the connection could be either a link named 
by that country or a link from another country naming it). Table 2 illustrates the egonet 
density (D) for each country expressed mathematically as D=2g/(n*(n-1)), where g is the 
number of actual ties between all countries in the egonet and n is the number of countries in 
the egonet. This acts as an indication of the degree of cohesion within that country’s 
overseas innovation network. According to Soda (2011) we would want a low density 
network to increase the likelihood of increased performance. We see that the countries with 
the largest egonets and lowest densities are Germany followed by Italy, UK, France, the 
Netherlands and Spain.    
 
4.3 Centrality  
The centrality of a country with respect to its firms which engage in technical 
cooperation abroad is most simply measured by the number of network ties surrounding the 
country. If this is the case then countries with the highest centrality tend to be the most 
powerful as information will tend to flow through them before it reaches others. The simplest 
measures of centrality are indegree (measured by the total of the incoming weighted ties 
naming SMEs in a particular country) and outdegree (measured by the total of the outgoing 
weighted ties named by SMEs in a particular country). For indegree we see from Table 1 
that Germany has the highest (95.08) followed by Italy (34.92), UK (27.60) and France 
(21.88) with all other countries having measures below 18. Conversely these countries were 
among the lowest for outdegree while the countries with high outdegree (Iceland at 30.81) 
tended to be among the lowest for indegree. We also tested for the Freeman betweeness 
centrality but found little significant effect on innovativeness for this model. 
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 Innovate EgoNet% Density Indegree Outdegree 
k-local 
Bridging 
Austria 0.23 87.90 0.35 12.46 9.27 30 
Belgium 0.19 84.80 0.36 11.03 7.96 20 
Bulgaria 0.35 63.60 0.39 2.08 10.10 36 
Croatia 0.20 45.50 0.47 1.57 10.18 22 
Cyprus 0.26 27.30 0.50 0.49 9.52 16 
Czech 0.28 60.60 0.43 7.25 4.67 12 
Denmark 0.26 72.70 0.44 13.00 10.76 30 
Estonia 0.19 51.50 0.53 2.18 13.80 32 
Finland 0.34 66.70 0.45 9.78 6.75 23 
France 0.11 97.00 0.31 21.88 1.82 20 
Germany 0.23 100.00 0.23 95.08 3.84 30 
Greece 0.22 57.60 0.44 6.02 9.22 57 
Hungary 0.18 60.60 0.42 3.50 6.70 24 
Iceland 0.44 54.50 0.44 0.17 30.81 65 
Ireland 0.18 45.50 0.51 1.53 5.86 16 
Italy 0.21 100.00 0.29 34.92 2.97 28 
Latvia 0.22 54.50 0.51 2.13 16.98 34 
Liechten 0.17 21.20 0.68 0.00 6.59 12 
Lithuania 0.31 57.60 0.48 1.80 14.04 36 
Luxem 0.12 27.30 0.66 0.24 9.32 16 
Macedon 0.30 51.50 0.42 0.20 15.77 30 
Malta 0.23 42.40 0.71 0.25 10.24 24 
Netherlands 0.23 93.90 0.33 16.04 6.57 26 
Norway 0.31 78.80 0.37 8.19 21.15 65 
Poland 0.32 69.70 0.41 5.67 9.24 36 
Portugal 0.15 48.50 0.46 0.68 7.17 26 
Romania 0.18 63.60 0.42 2.50 12.84 36 
Slovakia 0.22 60.60 0.39 2.24 13.10 28 
Slovenia 0.19 54.50 0.50 2.19 10.46 26 
Spain 0.18 93.90 0.34 9.53 5.30 28 
Sweden 0.27 78.80 0.37 17.97 11.57 32 
Turkey 0.35 66.70 0.45 7.57 8.30 34 
UK 0.14 97.00 0.31 27.60 4.90 34 
  
             Table 1 Network and Brokerage Measures 
 
4.4 Bridging 
We begin with a simple measure of bridging applied across the whole technical 
cooperation matrix before considering the way in which CTSMEs can act as bridges 
between groups or blocks of CTSMEs with shared network characteristics. A feature of 
structural hole theory is the key part played by ‘bridges’ who act as links between other 
actors in the network as information benefits are expected to travel over bridges. A bridge 
therefore is an edge (i.e. a tie between two countries) whose removal disconnects the 
(technical cooperation) graph. A k-local bridge is an edge whose removal increases the 
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distance of its endpoints to a value of k or more. We utilise the UCINET routine (Borgatti et 
al., 2002) which calculates the distance between the endpoints of each adjacent pair of 
vertices (countries) in the graph when the edge connecting them is deleted. 
Table 1 shows the values of the k-local bridge distances for each country summed 
across all other countries. The top three countries (Iceland, Norway and Greece) have very 
high scores but also are characterised by high variability within the scores. So, while most 
edge scores for most countries are 2 some edge scores are much higher which leads to a 
greater sum shown in Table 1 as well as a higher variability. For instance, the edge between 
Iceland and Malta has an individual score of 33, which, as the number of countries in the 
network, is the maximum possible score attainable. This is because Iceland is the only 
country who’s SMEs express a preference for technical cooperation with companies in 
Malta. Similarly the edge between Norway and Iceland also has an individual score of 33, 
since Norway is the only country with SMEs naming a preference for Icelandic companies 
with regard to technical cooperation. The same applies to the relationship between Greece 
and Cyprus, since Greece is the only country whose SMEs name Cyprus. 
  
4.5 Structural Equivalence  
A group of countries that have similar relationships with the same other countries in 
the technical cooperation network form a structurally equivalent block. Structural similarity 
may stimulate a competitive orientation in which countries’ firms are attentive to each other’s 
status and interests (Burt, 1987) as well as a cooperative orientation in which they are 
encouraged to engage in collaborative research (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2007). 
Accordingly the strategy for countries in the same block may be initially identified as 
following a joint policy of increasing innovativeness since their networks are structurally 
equivalent. We apply this concept to the data in this study and identify, initially two, then four 
structurally equivalent blocks (SE Blocks), making use of the UCINET structural equivalence 
optimisation routine (Borgatti and Everett, 2002). The two structurally equivalent blocks are:  
1:  Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Poland  
     Spain Sweden UK                                           
2:  Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Estonia Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Latvia  
     Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxemburg Macedonia Malta Portugal Romania Slovakia   
     Slovenia Turkey  
The results indicate that the longer established European members show similar structural 
equivalence, while the same is true for the new (and smaller) member states.  
Further analysis identifies four blocks, which are illustrated in Figure 1 showing that certain 
Baltic Sea countries (Block 4) exhibit common structural equivalence. These countries also 
have higher innovation scores. The countries with the lowest innovation scores lie in the 
structurally equivalent block in mainland Europe. Many of the countries that have recently 
joined Europe are in the middle two blocks regarding innovation. 
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Figure 1 Means Plot for Four Structurally Equivalent Blocks 
 
                
                    Figure 2 Digraph illustrating Structurally Equivalent Blocks 
                   (Produced using Netdraw. Line size indicates strength of tie) 
 
Block 3 
Block 2 
Block 4 
Block 1 
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Figure 2 shows the countries covered by the survey in the European network together with 
the directional edges connecting them and the grouping into structurally equivalent blocks. 
The line sizing indicates the strength of the relationship between the countries and highlights 
Germany’s powerful position. The blocked adjacency matrix derived from carrying out 
structural equivalence shows that blocks 1 and 4 (Figures 1 and 2), constituting the oldest 
established EU countries, attract dense ties from other blocks with the exception of block 2 
which does not have as many dense ties to block 4 as to other blocks. 
Brokerage 
Roles† 
Definition Interpretation 
Coordinator 
 
A-A-A 
 
A country that imports ideas* from 
countries belonging to its own block** and 
exports to countries belonging to its own 
block 
Example (coordinator in bold):  
Netherlands       Belgium        France 
Coordinators link different countries within the same 
block, therefore tightening the within block technical 
cooperation network they belong to (in the example, 
bilingual Belgium engages in technical cooperation 
with France while also being engaged by the 
Netherlands)  
Gatekeeper 
 
B-A-A 
A country that imports ideas from a country 
belonging to a different block and exports 
to countries within its own block 
Example (gatekeeper in bold): 
Turkey       Sweden       Finland 
Gatekeepers act as suppliers of imported ideas to 
countries belonging to their own block (in the 
example, Sweden engages with Finland while also 
being engaged by Turkey where the Swedish Research 
Institute in Istanbul (SRII) is based) 
Representative 
 
A-A-B 
A country that imports ideas from countries 
within its own block and exports to 
countries outside the block 
Example (representative in bold):  
Germany      UK       Ireland 
Representatives act as exporters of ideas produced 
within their own block and destined to countries in 
other blocks (in the example, UK is engaged by 
Germany while also engaging Ireland with which UK 
has shared academic-industry collaborations) 
Consultant 
 
B-A-B 
A country that imports ideas from and 
exports to countries belonging to the same 
block, but different from its own 
Example (consultant in bold):  
Croatia      Italy       Greece 
Consultants act as external players to a technical 
cooperation network in another block, linking 
countries belonging to that block from the outside (in 
the example, Italy is engaged by Croatia (which 
exports goods mainly to Italy) while also engaging 
Greece, which has strong trading links with Italy)  
Liaison 
 
B-A-C 
A country that imports ideas from and 
exports to countries belonging to other 
blocks 
Example (liaison in bold): 
Iceland      Norway       Germany 
Liaisons link countries belonging to technical 
cooperation networks in different blocks by acting as 
both importers and exporters of ideas (in the 
example, Norway is engaged by Iceland, which 
collaborates through RANNIS, while also engaging 
Germany where Norway has research and energy 
trading links) 
*  ‘A country that imports ideas’ refers to a CTSME being named by another CTSME with regard to technical cooperation and vice versa for exports  
** The term ‘block’ refers to the group of structurally equivalent countries with regard to technical cooperation rather than regional proximity 
† A, B and C are distinct blocks 
 
Table 2 Brokerage Roles (Gould and Fernandez, 1989; Amighini and Gorgoni, 2013) 
 We use Gould and Fernandez (1989) methods making use of the structurally 
equivalent blocks to categorise the brokerage roles, such as gatekeeper and liaison by 
group membership in order to investigate role relationships between the blocks. Table 2 
illustrates the roles played by a broker, which in this case represents a country’s typical SME 
(CTSME) within a block of structurally equivalent countries. The CTSME can act as a broker 
in five different ways. For instance a broker acting as a gatekeeper receives technical 
knowledge from a CTSME in a different country block and then shares this knowledge with a 
CTSME in another country within its own block.   
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Coord 
inator 
Gate  
keeper 
Represent
ative 
Consult
ant 
Liaison Total 
Balanced 
E-I 
Index_All 
Simmelian 
Ties 
E-I 
Index 
Sim 
Balanced 
E-I 
Index_Sim 
Block           
Austria 0 0.9 5.497 10.494 16.999 33.89 0.31 50 0.32 0.97 
Belgium 0.67 0.76 2.538 2.6 6.231 12.799 0.07 46 -0.65 0.27 
Germany 0.368 0.95 3.593 1.042 7.363 13.316 0.43 94 -0.11 0.70 
Italy 0.316 2.892 9.723 14.908 15.212 43.051 0.25 78 -0.21 0.62 
UK 0.67 0.725 18.669 13.497 27.294 60.855 0.27 88 -0.20 0.62 
Spain 0.1 1.851 1.982 3.428 12.544 19.904 0.33 54 0.04 0.81 
Netherlands 0 0.425 5.069 4.53 14.479 24.503 0.26 70 0 0.78 
France 0 1.518 4.25 8.158 18.099 32.025 0.23 46 -0.30 0.54 
Average 0.266 1.253 6.415 7.332 14.778 30.043 0.269 65.750 -0.139 0.664 
Cyprus 0 0 0.125 0 0 0.125 0.75 0 0 - 
Croatia 0.81 0.811 0.125 0 0 1.746 0.94 0 0 - 
Ireland 0.125 0.236 0.143 0 0 0.504 0.87 2 1.00 0.44 
Greece 1.125 6.661 0.278 0.1 0.993 9.156 0.91 2 1.00 0.44 
Hungary 1.343 1.325 4.322 1.095 2.525 10.61 0.90 26 0.85 0.56 
Czech 0.643 1.135 3.311 1.944 3.583 10.616 0.89 4 0.50 0.83 
Macedon 0.5 0.111 0.958 0 0.726 2.296 0.97 0 0 - 
Luxem 0 0 0 0.243 0.143 0.386 0.87 2 1.00 0.44 
Liechten 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.87 0 0 - 
Slovakia 3 4.111 3.686 0.669 1.084 12.55 0.72 14 0.57 0.77 
Portugal 0 2.381 0 0.1 1.393 3.873 0.94 12 1.00 0.44 
Average 0.686 1.525 1.177 0.377 0.950 4.715 0.875 5.636 0.538 0.560 
Bulgaria 0.333 2.31 0.768 1.035 2.385 6.831 0.86 20 0.20 0.94 
Lithuania 0.367 2.367 0.4 0.111 0.597 3.842 1.00 8 0 0.78 
Latvia 0 0.333 0.31 0.111 0 0.754 0.96 4 -0.50 0.39 
Romania 1.167 5.819 1.497 1.729 4.49 14.702 0.87 36 0.56 0.79 
Estonia 0 2.333 0 0.292 0.403 3.028 0.95 4 -0.50 0.39 
Slovenia 0 0 1.211 1.234 2.693 5.138 0.83 0 0 - 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.85 0 0 - 
Turkey 0.75 2.317 1.548 1.802 3.869 10.286 0.91 24 0.50 0.83 
Iceland 0 1 0 0 0.111 1.111 0.96 0 0 - 
Average 0.291 1.831 0.637 0.702 1.616 5.077 0.910 10.667 0.029 0.687 
Denmark 0.403 1.869 2.101 2.002 4.919 11.294 0.69 68 0.29 0.99 
Finland 0 0.492 1.98 3.808 6.746 13.026 0.81 22 0.27 0.99 
Sweden 0.111 5.773 0.81 4.935 12.969 24.598 0.98 84 0.40 0.91 
Norway 0 1.629 4.768 13.878 21.366 41.64 0.65 20 0.20 0.94 
Poland 0 1.877 5.297 5.455 18.917 31.546 0.87 70 0.63 0.73 
Average 0.103 2.328 2.991 6.016 12.983 24.421 0.800 52.800 0.358 0.912 
 
     Table 3 Brokerage Role Scores (Weighted Method) and Simmelian block measures 
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Tables 3 and 4 result from performing brokerage analysis using the UCINET software 
(Borgatti et al., 2002). In Table 3 the countries, having been previously partitioned into 
structurally equivalent blocks, have been given brokerage scores where each row counts the 
weighted number of times that each country plays each of the five roles in the whole graph. 
The weighting is used because, in this context, we are more interested in group relations 
between blocks of countries. As an example suppose that a country, B, acts as a 
representative between countries A and C (Table 2) while some other actor, D, is also acting 
as a representative between A and C then B and D would each get half the score for this 
role rather than the full score.  
Table 3 shows that UK has the highest total score due to its brokerage activity as a 
representative, liaison and consultant relating mainly to countries in block 2 and to a lesser 
extent block 4 (see also Table 4). These countries include Ireland and Cyprus with which the 
UK has strong ties. The next highest scorer is Italy which again acts as a representative, 
consultant and liaison but also gatekeeper involving block 2 and to a lesser extent block 4. 
Italy has contacts with block 2 countries Greece, Portugal and Ireland as well as contacts 
with block 4 countries Poland and Finland. The third highest scorer is Norway which plays a 
central role as liaison between block 3 and blocks 1&2 as well as acting as a consultant for 
block 3 and representative for block 1. Table 3 also illustrates the gatekeeper block average 
scores for each CTSME block. So, for instance, the same block average score of 1.525 is 
used for Ireland, Hungary and Portugal (as, indeed, for all CTSMEs in that block) as the 
value of the explanatory variable in the regression model (Table 6). This is because, 
according to hypothesis 5, the innovativeness of each CTSME in a block is improved by the 
overall gatekeeping performance of the member CTSMEs. 
 
Block 1 1 2 3 4 
1 0.25 4.25 1.25 0.88 
2 1.00 5.88 2.38 3.63 
3 0.00 4.75 1.25 0.38 
4 0.00 3.00 0.75 0.00 
Block 2 1 2 3 4 
1 0.00 0.45 0.36 0.09 
2 0.18 0.73 0.45 0.36 
3 0.00 0.73 0.18 0.00 
4 0.00 0.36 0.18 0.00 
Block 3 1 2 3 4 
1 0.00 0.44 0.56 0.22 
2 0.11 0.56 0.56 0.33 
3 0.00 0.44 0.22 0.11 
4 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.00 
Block 4 1 2 3 4 
1 0.20 1.40 4.40 0.60 
2 0.40 1.20 4.60 1.20 
3 0.00 2.00 4.80 0.60 
4 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00 
 
             Table 4 Brokerage Block Relations (Average Scores) 
Illustrates block 1 acting as a 
consultant to block 2: 
 2-1-2 with score 5.88                   
(See also Tables 2&3) 
 
 
Illustrates block 4 acting as a 
gatekeeper from block 2: 
2-4-4 with score 1.20 
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Table 4 illustrates the frequency with which countries in each block are involved in 
relations among and within each of the other blocks. We see, for instance, that the countries 
of block 1 (Austria, Belgium, Germany etc.) have stronger relations with countries in block 2 
than other blocks. The score 5.88 refers to the role of consultant indicating the amount of 
connections made by block 1 countries acting as a consultant to block two countries by 
connecting a member of block 2 to another member of block 2 (2-1-2). The main consultants 
in block 1 are Italy, UK and Austria (Table 3). The score 4.25 refers to the role of 
representative indicating the amount of connections made by block 1 countries acting as a 
representative in block 2 (1-1-2). The main representative in block 1 is UK mostly involving 
block 2. The UK’s other significant roles are as a consultant for block 2 and as a liaison 
between blocks 2 and 3 and also between blocks 2 and 4. The role of gatekeeper is 
reflected for each block by the scores attracted from other blocks. So, for instance, block 1 
attracts a score of 1.0 from block 2 due mainly to the role of Italy as a gatekeeper (2-1-1). 
The main gatekeepers for block 2 are Greece and Slovakia, while for block 3 the main 
gatekeeper is Romania. The gate-keeping role for block 4 is mainly carried out by Sweden 
through attracting ties from block 2 countries giving a score of 1.20 (2-4-4). 
4.6 Balanced Ties 
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the inverse U-shape of the plots of innovativeness against 
the ordinary and Simmelian E-I indices. The shape supports the formulation of the balanced 
E-I indices in Section 3.3, since the CTSMEs with E-I indices close to the median have the 
highest innovativeness.  
 
 
 Figure 3a Inverse U-shape plot of innovativeness against E-I index 
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    Figure 3b Inverse U-shape plot of innovativeness against Simmelian E-I index 
Figures 4a and 4b further illustrate the balanced ties concept in relation to Simmelian 
ties. A country (A) is said to have a Simmelian tie with another country (B) if A is part of a 
reciprocated triad (including also C). If B is within A’s block then the Simmelian tie with B is a 
within block tie and an outside of block tie otherwise. For instance, Figure 4a illustrates all of 
the Czech Republic’s Simmelian ties. It has a within block Simmelian tie with Slovakia, an 
outside of block tie with Germany and two outside of block ties with Austria. The last three 
columns of Table 3 show the total number of reciprocated Simmelian ties for each country 
together with the E-I and balanced E-I indices. For the Czech Republic we have four 
Simmelian ties, one within and three outside of block giving an E-I index of 0.50 (= (3-
1)/(3+1)) and a balanced E-I index of 0.83 (=(1-abs(0.28-0.5)+0.28)/1+0.28), where 0.28 is 
the median E-I index for all European countries with Simmelian ties. Some countries, such 
as Croatia and Cyprus have no Simmelian ties and so are excluded from the balanced E-I 
index calculation.  
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  Figure 4a Illustrating all four of Czech Republic’s Simmelian Ties 
 
                Figure 4b Digraph of reciprocated Simmelian ties in Block Structure 
The countries with the highest strength of Simmelian ties are Germany followed closely 
by UK and Sweden. This is illustrated in Figure 4b which shows the reciprocated Simmelian 
tie network of countries’ ties. The countries with the highest balanced E-I indices are mainly 
Slovakia 
Internal Simmelian Tie 
with Slovakia (1) 
Austria 
External Simmelian 
Ties with Germany (1) 
and Austria (2) 
Block 2 
Block 1 
Germany 
Czech 
Block 4 
Block 1 Block 2 
Block 3 
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from the Baltic Sea block of countries, such as Finland, Denmark and Norway. These 
countries display equilibrium between within block and outside of block Simmelian ties.  
5. Summary Analysis 
We summarise by attending to the relationship between innovativeness and the network 
and economic variables outlined above. Least squares regression found little relationship 
between innovation and egonet size but a weak negative relationship between innovation 
and density which was not statistically significant (R-Square=0.007, p=0.64). There is a 
strong positive linear relationship between a country’s outdegree and its innovation (R-
Square=0.327, p=0.0005), but no significant relationship between indegree and innovation. 
There is a positive linear relationship between occupying a bridging position and 
innovativeness (R-Square=0.275, p=0.002). Some values indicate mild exceptions (>1.5 
Standard deviations). For instance Finland and Turkey (as well as Bulgaria, Czech Republic 
and Iceland) have higher innovativeness levels than predicted by their bridging positions 
while the UK (as well as France and Greece) has a lower innovation level than predicted.  
Analysis of variance on the levels of innovativeness of countries attached to structurally 
equivalent blocks show that when the countries were divided into two structural blocks there 
is no significant difference between the innovativeness of the blocks. However when they 
are split into four blocks there is a significant difference (ANOVA, p=0.007) with the greatest 
difference between block 1 and blocks 3 and 4.              
In Table 5 we present a correlation matrix. There is a strong correlation between 
innovativeness and the balanced E-I Simmelian index as well as k-local bridging and the 
CTSME gatekeeper block average. There is a less significant positive correlation between 
innovativeness and the balanced E-I index for all CTSMEs with bridging ties, while there is a 
negative correlation (not significant) between innovativeness and density as well as the 
liaison role. There are significant correlations between the balanced E-I index for all bridging 
ties and the density and liaison variables as well as between the density and liaison 
variables themselves leading to the exercise of caution concerning collinearity.   
Table 6 shows the results of seven models. The first hypothesis associates high 
outdegree, the second the bridging of structural holes, the third a negative effect of dense 
networks, while the fourth associates a negative effect of occupying a liaison brokerage role. 
All four of these hypotheses are supported, though in the case of the liaison role significance 
is only achieved in model 2. The fifth hypothesis associates the average gatekeeper score of 
the block to which a CTSME belongs with the innovativeness of the CTSME. This hypothesis 
is also supported. The increase in the number of employees is the only significant economic 
explanatory variable for these three models.  
Models 4 and 5 test hypothesis 6 and are based on data from the 33 CTSMEs which 
had ties both within and outside of their own country block. In this situation each CTSME 
behaves as a bridge both within and outside of its block and the level of balance between 
these types of ties is measured using the balanced E-I index as explanatory variable. In 
model 4, which has a poorer fit than any previous model (variance inflation factor < 4.19 and 
Adjusted R-Squared = 0.444), the k-local bridging variable, measured across all CTSMEs, is 
the only one of the network and economic explanatory variables to have significance.  
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 Innovate Outdegree 
k-local  
Bridging 
Density Liaison 
Gatekeeper 
Block Average 
Balance E-I 
Index All 
Balance E-I 
Index Simm 
Employee 
Increase 
Financial 
Support 
Logistic 
Support 
Innovate 1 .568** .516** -.084 -.090 .550** .346* .661*** .311 -.145 -.225 
Outdegree  1 .693*** .198 -.252 .466** .451** .142 .215 -.380* .126 
k-local Bridging   1 -.258 .202 .368* .138 .212 .164 -.335 -.095 
Density    1 -.641*** .256 .616*** -.299 -.076 .273 -.017 
Liaison     1 -.052 -.663*** .303 .130 -.120 .170 
Gatekeeper Block 
Average 
     1 .571** .446* .077 -.040 -.223 
Balance E-I Index 
All 
      1 .035 .042 .052 -.241 
Balance E-I Index 
Simmelian 
       1 .164 .030 -.150 
Employee Increase         1 -.190 .136 
Financial Support          1 .012 
Logistic Support           1 
     
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (Two-tailed) (all based on 33 CTSMEs except Balanced E-I Index Simmelian which is based on 26 CTSMEs) 
                                                                         Table 5 Correlations     
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* p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001;  
† Models 6 & 7 are based on data from the 26 CTSMEs which had Simmelian ties. All other models use data from 33 CTSMEs.  
†† Explanatory variables are standardised with values between 0 and 1 where appropriate to accommodate interaction analysis.   
                                                                   Table 6 Results of Regression Analysis  
  
Dependent Variable 
Innovativeness 
Hypo- 
thesis 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6† Model 7† 
Explanatory Variable††  Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Social Network                
Constant  .202*** .029 .210*** .029 .198*** .028 .212** .060 .208*** .044 .089** .030 .105*** .022 
Outdegree 1 .024 .019   .033* .013 .023 .020   -.018 .014   
k-local Bridging 2 .006 .017 .024 .012   .007 .018 .027* .012 .020 .011 .020** .007 
Density 3 -.034* .015 -.027 .014 -.035* .013 -.033 .016   .001 .015   
Liaison 4 -.022 .014 -.027* .013 -.020 .013 -.024 .019   -.014 .010   
Gatekeeper Block Average 5 .033* .012 .036** .012 .032** .011 .035* .015 .024 .013 .020 .010 .017** .005 
Balanced E-I Index All 6       -.014 .072 .023 .046     
Balanced E-I Index Simmelian 7           .139** .039 .123*** .025 
Economic                
Increase in employees  .012 .007 .025* .011 .025* .010 .012 .007 .025 .012 .021** .005 .033*** .005 
Govt. financial support  .142 .140 .032 .134 .109 .134 .141 .143 -.024 .140 .306** .097 .290** .074 
Govt. logistical support  -.079 .156 .069 .191 .100 .182 -.082 .160 .023 .205 -.417* .148 -.287* .108 
Increase in employees x 
Govt. logistical support 
   -.156 .118 -.192 .114   -.180 .127   -.260** .068 
Variance Inflation Factor  <3.95  <4.16  <4.30  <4.19  <4.20  <4.02  <3.64  
R-Squared Adj.  0.466  0.469  0.520  0.444  0.394  0.800  0.881  
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Interactions between all the explanatory variables were then tested with little or no 
improvement to the model fit.  Model 5 excludes the outdegree, density and liaison variables 
while keeping the bridging variable together with an interaction between the increase in 
employees and government logistical support variables. The only significant explanatory 
variable is the k-local bridging variable offering some support to hypothesis 2. When 
interactions were tested the models were either not any more significant or suffered from 
high variance inflation factors due to collinearity between the balanced E-I index and other 
variables such as the density, liaison and outdegree variables.    
Models 6 and 7 test hypothesis 7 and are based on data from the 26 CTSMEs which 
had within and outside of block Simmelian ties and include the balanced E-I index as 
explanatory variable. In model 6, which has an improved fit to all previous models (variance 
inflation factor < 4.02 and Adjusted R-Squared = 0.80), some of the network and economic 
explanatory variables have significance. These are the balanced Simmelian bridging, 
economic growth as in the increase in the number of employees, government financial 
support (positive effect) and government logistical support (negative effect). Interactions 
between all the explanatory variables were then tested and model 7 re-introduces the k-local 
bridging variable together with an interaction between the increase in employees and 
government logistical support economic variables. All of the explanatory variables are 
significant in this model which supports hypotheses two, five and seven demonstrating an 
effect of the k-local bridging, gatekeeper block average and balanced Simmelian bridging 
social network factors. We also tested other explanatory variables such as the increase in 
SME turnover, the age of the SME, whether or not the SME invested abroad and the 
population of the country to which the SME belonged and found no significant results for this 
data set.  
The regression analysis showed significant network effects associated with the block 
structure of the CTSMEs. We therefore summarise the main structural characteristics for 
each block as follows:  
SE Block 1. The countries in this block have high brokerage totals with strong scores for 
representative, consultant and liaison roles (Table 3). They are representatives for block 2 
and 3 countries as well as liaisons (2-1-3 and 3-1-2) and consultants and gatekeepers for 
Block 2 countries (Table 4). The main gatekeeper is Italy which attracts ties from block 2.  
The block 1 countries are homogeneous with regard to bridging (Table 1) with the 
exceptions of France (low bridging level) and the UK (high bridging level). The countries in 
this block have a high number of Simmelian ties which are mostly within block (negative E-I 
index average). 
SE Block 2. The countries in this block have the lowest brokerage totals. They are 
consultants and representatives for block 3 as well as coordinators for block 2 and 
gatekeepers for blocks 1 and 3. The main gatekeepers are Greece and Slovakia. The block 
2 countries have medium to low scores for bridging capacity (with the exception of Greece 
which has a high score and Czech Republic and Liechtenstein with very low scores) as well 
as medium to low scores for innovativeness with the exceptions of Macedonia and the 
Czech Republic which have high scores. The countries in this block have a low number of 
Simmelian ties which are mostly outside of the block (positive E-I index average).   
SE Block 3. The countries in this block have low brokerage scores. They are gatekeepers for 
blocks 2, 3 and 4 as well as consultants for block 2 (Table 4). The main gatekeeper is 
Romania which maintains ties with all other blocks. The block 3 countries have high scores 
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for bridging capacity (with the exception of Malta and Slovenia) as well as medium to high 
scores for innovativeness (with the exceptions of Romania, Estonia and Slovenia) which 
have lower scores. The countries in this block have a below average number of Simmelian 
ties which are both within and outside of the block (E-I index average close to zero).  
SE Block 4. The countries in this block have high brokerage scores. They are gatekeepers 
and consultants for blocks 2, 1 and 3 as well as liaisons (1-4-3, 2-4-3) and representatives 
for block 3. The main gatekeeper for this block is Sweden, which attracts ties mainly from 
block 2 countries. The countries in block 4 have high scores for innovativeness as well as 
medium to high scores, with the exception of Finland, for bridging capacity. They also have a 
high number of homogenous Simmelian ties which lie both within and outside of the block 
but are skewed to outside ties. The balanced E-I index is close to one showing optimal 
balance.    
6. Conclusion (including implications for practice)  
We introduce the concept of country typical SME (CTSME) in order to construct a proxy 
network with each node representing the economic and networking behaviour of a firm 
representing its country within Europe. We then observe the structure of CTSMEs’ technical 
cooperation networks and thereby enhance our understanding of their ability to absorb and 
engage in innovation with CTSMEs in other European countries. By adopting structural 
equivalence (that is, CTSMEs that have similar relationships with the same other CTSMEs) 
rather than regional proximity we identify blocks of country typical SMEs with similar network 
features. Our research then demonstrates increased innovativeness through adopting a 
cooperative, as opposed to just competitive, bridging strategy. That is, while the 
conventionally measured outgoing ability to form bridges across less densely connected 
firms has significance, this is outweighed by the balanced cooperative (Simmelian) bridging 
capacity of a CTSME acting within its associated block of countries. In the long term, and for 
suitably located firms, cooperative structure may outweigh individualistic competitive 
brokerage.  Another feature of structure is that the role of gatekeeper, seen as averaged 
over the CTSMEs in a block, is positively associated with the innovativeness of each 
member CTSME, emphasising the value of environment monitoring and the translation of 
technical information into a form understandable to the business community of the block 
membership. 
The inverse U-shape of the plots of CTSME innovativeness against their E-I and 
Simmelian E-I indices strikes a resonance with the earlier work of Gulati et al. (2012), which 
identified an inverted U-shaped pattern of a small world system’s evolutionary dynamics over 
a period of time. The shape of the development was explained as being due to three factors. 
Firstly, in terms of the reduced ability of actors to form bridging ties as the intensity of such 
ties increases. Secondly, due to the increasing homogenization of the social system which 
makes it less attractive to new actors which in turn limits the formation of bridging ties to 
outside clusters. And thirdly, due to fragmentation and the inability of the system to retain 
current clusters. In our study, which is not dynamic, we capture a snapshot of the structure 
of technical cooperation networks and confirm that dense structures mitigate against the 
growth of innovation but further investigate both conventional and Simmelian bridging 
mechanisms and the balance between relationships within and outside of block structures. 
Interestingly, although both types of bridging mechanisms display an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with CTSME innovativeness, it is the balanced Simmelian bridging that is most 
strongly associated. The conclusion we reach is that Simmelian tie formation adds a special 
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new dimension to the relationship enabling a more cooperative, trusting and long term 
environment for the development of innovation, but that it is also important that the formation 
of new within and outside of block relationships are balanced to maintain performance. 
Specific examples of CTSMEs are worthy of note. Belgium’s CTSME, for instance, does 
not, allowing for the limitations of our study, display this equilibrium with regard to Simmelian 
ties, since it has very few such ties outside of its own block (E-I Index = -0.65, Table 1). 
Firms in Belgium could consider forming such ties with countries in another block such as 
Finland, the Czech Republic or Slovenia. For CTSMEs currently without Simmelian ties 
(Croatia, Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Malta and Slovenia) attention might be 
given to the formation of such ties. Firms in Iceland, for instance, might consider forming 
reciprocal technical cooperation ties with countries in their own block such as Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania while also improving ties with longer established CTSMEs in the Baltic Sea 
block such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden since most of these countries already have 
strong Simmelian ties. Countries who’s CTSMEs display a strong Simmelian balance, such 
as Denmark, Finland, Austria and Sweden, would do well to keep track of the dynamic 
structure of the European technical cooperation network including the entry of new countries 
and form new relationships accordingly.                   
Further strategic considerations follow from closer inspection of the structurally 
equivalent blocks. The countries in these blocks should be more sensitive about following a 
joint policy of harmonising innovation and balanced Simmelian bridging capacity due to the 
similarities in their network structures. The practical implications vary depending on the block 
to which the country belongs. Block 1 CTSMEs in older and larger European countries who 
are so good at forming within block Simmelian ties could seek for more of these ties outside 
of their own block which may open up new opportunities for collaborative innovation. For the 
same reason they might adopt gatekeeper roles, since they already have strong network 
links with blocks 2 and 3. They might also extend their brokerage influence by greater 
technical cooperation with block 4 countries in the Baltic Sea. For blocks 2 and 3 similar 
strategies could be adopted. This might involve the formation of more Simmelian ties both 
within (especially those who currently have no Simmelian ties) and outside of own block. A 
further improvement could be the enhancement of gate-keeping with other blocks. In 
contrast, block 4 countries have both a high number and optimal equilibrium of (within and 
outside of block) Simmelian ties. They might, however, increase their brokerage strength by 
extending gate-keeping opportunities to attract ties from blocks 1 and 3.  
A firm’s innovative activity is also influenced by economic factors such as growth, 
maturity, government support and the involvement in overseas investment. Our findings 
show that, while growth in employment levels is associated with innovative activity, growth in 
turnover is not. This may indicate that the increase in current employment levels is a better 
indicator of recent innovative engagement than increase in prosperity. The study, which is 
not longitudinal, is not able to reveal the effect of growth at an earlier stage to innovative 
activity at a later stage (or vice versa). With regard to maturity this is positively, but not 
significantly, associated with innovativeness. This is partially accounted for by the fact that 
firms in countries which are new entrants to the European Union have lower maturity and yet 
have quite high reported innovation levels. Firms in the other countries with higher maturity 
have higher investment abroad and stronger liaison roles neither of which is associated with 
innovative activity. Another finding is that, while innovativeness increases with government 
financial support, the reverse is true for logistic support. Zeng et. al. (2010) report similar 
findings for Chinese firms. A possible explanation is that governments may be more likely to 
give financial support to growing firms already engaged in innovative activity while only 
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offering logistic support to those not already so engaged. There may also be a time lag 
between support and the achievement of innovation. The type of support may, however, be 
crucial and Rothwell and Dodgson (1991) highlight the need for carefully adapted strategic 
policies throughout the innovation chain. Investment abroad is not significantly associated 
with CTSME innovativeness. In fact there is a small negative effect. It could be that firms 
face a competitive choice between allocating resources to their own innovative activity and 
overseas investment rendering the activities to some degree mutually exclusive.  
The methods used in this study have some limitations. The use of brokerage theory in 
the context of preference for technical cooperation with European countries abroad imposes 
the limitation that, since each firm names only a country and not another firm, the brokerage 
and other scores do not actually reflect relationships between firms. In this sense the 
technical cooperation network is a proxy network of country typical SMEs (CTSMEs) and this 
must be taken into account when evaluating its impact. We argue that the brokerage scores 
of CTSMEs do measure the likelihood that technical cooperation relationships such as 
bridges between firms and equivalence between structural blocks exist, since the more 
preferences that are expressed for cooperation with a particular country then the more likely 
it is that ties exist between the countries’ firms, given that only firms with actual technical 
cooperation ties abroad were asked to name country preferences. Another limitation is that 
the respondents in the IEM Survey (2009) were asked if they had introduced any new 
product or service in the market in the last three years but the nature of the innovation was 
not specified. Their innovation was therefore self-reported although reference to other survey 
data (Eurostat Yearbook, 2013) generally confirms its validity. There was not therefore a 
formal evaluation of the knowledge and technology transfer activities of the firms involved in 
the survey (Tsekouras et al., 2010). 
 To conclude, our research revealing the structure of the European technical cooperation 
network, economic factors and the association with the spread of innovation offers concrete 
assistance to the formulation of effective SME, government and European policy.     
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